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ENERGY TRANSITIONS IN THE TRUMP
ADMINISTRATION AND BEYOND
BY
ALEXANDRA B. KLASS*

This Essay evaluates U.S. transitions in the energy sector
between 2016 and 2020 against the backdrop of the Trump
administration's stated priorities regarding energy policy and the
administration's successes and failures in implementing those
policies. Specifically, this Essay details President Trump's policies
and regulatory actions with regard to the electricity sector, the
transportation sector, energy development on public lands, and
federal approvals of energy infrastructure projects. It ends on a
somewhat hopeful note, recognizing that while the Trump
administration certainly slowed the pace of a U.S. clean energy
transition, the transition continued to make forward progress as a
result of countervailing trends in economics, technological advances,
private sector preferences, and policy development at the state and
local levels. Thus, a foundation exists for the Biden administration to
accelerate that transition, hopefully in time to minimize U.S.
contributions to global climate change and create the clean energy
economy we urgently need.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Soon after President Trump's election in November 2016, the
Environmental, Natural Resources, and Energy Law Section of the
*Distinguished McKnight University Professor, University of Minnesota Law School.
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Minnesota State Bar Association asked me to participate in a panel.
presentation entitled "Environmental and Energy Law and Policy Under
a Trump Administration." During the session, which took place in
January 2017, one speaker focused on environmental law and policy
issues, another speaker focused on climate-specific issues, and I covered
energy law and policy issues. At this point in time, we all had
assumptions about the likely priorities of the Trump administration
based on statements and promises made during the campaign, but detail
was lacking. President Trump had already nominated Ryan Zinke to be
Secretary of the Interior, Rick Perry to be Secretary of Energy, and Scott
Pruitt to be the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator,
but the Senate would not approve the nominations until a few months
later. We knew the Pruitt nomination did not bode well for continued
enforcement of the nation's environmental protection laws, but the
implications of a Secretary Zinke at Interior or a Secretary Perry at
Energy were less clear. Indeed, Rick Perry had been the governor of Texas
when that state undertook the largest build-out of wind energy and
related transmission infrastructure in the nation to date. During the
presentation, we discussed some of the more vulnerable Obama
administration regulations and initiatives and made some predictions
about regulatory rollbacks and their implications. At the time, it was a
helpful exercise for me to review more specifically what the Presidentelect had said during the campaign on these issues, particularly those
surrounding energy policy and energy projects, and consider the
implications for the future.
Over the next few months, I realized that there was a broader
audience for this information. With no time to waste, President Trump
quickly issued executive orders to substantially shrink national
monuments like Bears Ears and Grand Staircase Escalante in Utah. The
administration began the process of rolling back virtually every Obamaera regulation designed to reduce greenhouse (GHG) emissions and other
pollutants from automobiles and power plants, minimize air and water
pollutants from onshore and offshore oil and gas drilling, increase energy
efficiency of appliances, and the like. Unlike other policy areas, such as
immigration and international trade, where the administration was often
at war with itself, in the environmental and energy realm, there was a
clear focus to support fossil fuel development, withdraw from the Paris
climate accords, reduce regulations on industry, slow-walk renewable
energy development, limit the role of science in policymaking, and impede
1
access to government information. Moreover, not only was the policy
focus clear, the implementation was swift, with immediate actions to stay
or reverse existing regulations and replace them with new ones. With
these environmental and energy policy issues so frequently in the news
both domestically and internationally, a larger segment of the public

1 Elizabeth Kolbert, Earth Day in the Age of Trump, NEW YORKER (Apr. 12, 2017),
https://perma.cc/6UQQ-CKSL.
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began to pay attention to U.S. public lands, changes in the energy sector,
and the role of climate change. With donations to environmental advocacy
groups skyrocketing after President Trump's election, activity in the
courts also accelerated, contributing even more to the increase in
newsworthy events surrounding energy and environment.
By spring of 2017, I was receiving an increasing number of requests

to speak about these issues and created a presentation based on the initial
one in January to discuss the impacts of the Trump administration on
U.S. energy issues. Since that time, I have given this presentation, with
regular updates, at a local high school; at liberal arts colleges in the
United States; at universities in Sweden, Denmark, and Finland; and at
U.S. law schools and universities around the country. At each
presentation I was struck by the level of interest in energy issues as well
as the depth of knowledge, even among high school and college students,
about the U.S. energy system and what is at stake. During these several
years of presenting this information, I have never had the opportunity to
put in writing my thoughts on these presentations, and I am grateful for
the opportunity to do so now as a result of this distinguished lecture at
Lewis & Clark Law School.
As I often stated at the beginning of these presentations,, the topic of
"U.S. Energy Transitions in the Trump Administration" is not as doom
and gloom as it might be, particularly as compared to a presentation on
"U.S. Environmental Issues in the Trump Administration." 2 This is
because many aspects of energy production and use in the United States
are shaped more by economics, technology, and state policy than by
federal policy. Federal energy policy is critically important of course, but
even a suite of federal policies to promote fossil fuels can run into
opposition from powerful corporations, like electric utilities, that must
also consider long-term economic trends, technology development, and
costs to retail customers. Moreover, at least in the electricity sector, states
also set energy policy in important ways, and it is an understatement to

say that many states were not on board with the energy vision of the
Trump administration. Finally, in its haste to enact its deregulatory
agenda, the Trump administration often failed to comply with
Congressional mandates and the procedural requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 3 resulting in frequent setbacks in the
federal courts.
Nevertheless, even when the Trump administration did not fully

succeed in various aspects of its deregulatory agenda because of state or
industry opposition or judicial roadblocks, it had a significant influence
on the U.S. clean energy transition. This is because some areas, like

2 For a dire assessment of the state of environmental regulation and enforcement in the
Trump administration written by former EPA staffers, see SAVE EPA, THE TRUMP
TAKEOVER OF EPA: THROWING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN REVERSE (June 4, 2020),

https://perma.cc/GPR3-X2MM.
3 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
5335, 5372, 7521 (2018).
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transportation-related emissions, are more solidly within the realm of
federal policy, and also because it takes massive amounts of time,
funding, and personnel to challenge the continued regulatory assault on
the nation's clean energy laws and regulations. This in turn diverts
valuable resources away from forward-looking clean energy
policymaking. Likewise, in promoting a regulatory agenda that
attempted to lock in the long-term continued use of fossil fuels to produce
energy, the Trump administration prevented the United States from
serving in a leadership role on the world stage when it comes to energy
transition. This has dire consequences for global climate change, not to
mention the lost domestic clean energy jobs and other long-term economic
benefits that come with that leadership role.
This Essay will proceed to describe President Trump's priorities with
regard to energy policy and the status of implementation with regard to
the electricity sector, the transportation sector, energy development on
public lands, and federal approvals of energy infrastructure projects. It
ends on a somewhat hopeful note, recognizing that while the Trump
administration certainly slowed the pace of a U.S. clean energy
transition, the transition was not entirely stopped. Thus, the building
blocks are there for the Biden administration to accelerate that
transition, hopefully in time to minimize the U.S. contributions to global
climate change and create a vibrant, clean energy economy. Just as
important, a new administration that strongly embraces a clean energy
transition can return the United States to its position as a leader for the
rest of the world and help shape global action to address climate change.
II.

PRESIDENT TRUMP'S "ENERGY DOMINANCE"

During the 2016 presidential campaign and after taking office,
President Trump consistently declared a goal of U.S. "energy
dominance." 4 On one level, promises of U.S. energy dominance could be
seen as simply another component of President Trump's "America First"
political agenda. 5 However, by the time of the 2016 presidential election,
the U.S. energy landscape had changed so dramatically in the prior ten
years that the phrase could not simply be dismissed as campaign bluster.

4 See, e.g., Heather Richards, Trump and "Energy Dominance:" What's Next?, E&E
NEWS: ENERGYWIRE (June 2, 2020), https://perma.cc/SNG6-MPZT; President Donald J.
Trump Unleashes America's Energy Potential, WHITE HOUSE (June 27, 2017),
https://perma.cc/XCW9-LDNQ (listing actions taken by President Trump upon his election
to achieve "American energy dominance"); President Trump Vows to Usher in Golden Era of
American Energy Dominance, WHITE HOUSE (June 30, 2017), https://perma.cc/4NAQ-SBW7
("The President explained that he-is not only focusing on 'energy independence' but also
'energy dominance."'); PresidentDonald J. Trump is Ending the War on American Energy
and Delivering a New Era of Energy Dominance, WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 23, 2019),
https://perma.cc/3EN6-3ME9 ("Instead of relying on foreign oil and foreign energy, we are
now relying on American energy and American workers like never before.").
5 Lincoln L. Davies et al., Trump, Energy Policy, and Hard Look Review, 64 ROCKY
MOUNTAIN MIN. L. INST. 21 (2018).
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After decades of concern about U.S. energy security, dependence on oil
from the Middle East, and dwindling supplies of natural gas, the
"fracking revolution" that began in approximately 2007 had radically
transformed the U.S. energy outlook. Where shortages of oil and natural
gas once loomed large, abundance was now present. Implementation of
new technologies like hydraulic fracturing and directional drilling opened
up expansive U.S. shale reserves to oil and gas exploration, improving
U.S. energy security and creating new export opportunities.

For instance, prior to 2007, U.S. natural gas production was
declining rapidly, and the industry was focused on building liquefied
natural gas import terminals to ensure adequate supplies of natural gas

for U.S. heating, electricity, and industrial uses.6 By 2017, the United
States had become a net exporter of natural gas, with major production
centers in Texas and the Marcellus Shale region of Pennsylvania. 7 This
made natural gas readily available at low prices that would stay low
potentially for decades, allowing that fuel to compete directly with coal as
a "baseload" fuel to generate electricity for the first time ever.
As for oil, which dominates the transportation sector, more supply
meant lower prices and transformed the United States from a major oil
importer to a major oil exporter for the first time since the 1970s, when
Congress had banned such exports to reduce the nation's dependency on
oil from the Middle East. In 2015, Congress lifted the ban and, by 2018,
the United States was the top oil producing country in the world. 8
During this same time period, investor-owned electric utilities and
other private sector actors in the electricity sector began to invest heavily
in renewable energy resources-first wind and then solar-spurred by
state renewable portfolio standards. (RPSs) requiring this investment,
federal tax credits for renewable electricity generation, and ongoing
technological developments that both decreased the cost of these
resources and increased their output. In 2019, renewable energy
resources provided over 17% of U.S. electricity, with wind and solar
energy alone providing nearly 10% and growing rapidly, up from almost
zero in 2000.9 Beginning in the 2010s, electric vehicles (EVs) also entered
6 See, e.g., James W. Coleman & Alexandra B. Klass, Energy and Eminent Domain, 104
MINN. L. REV. 659, 662-74 (2019) (discussing a "fracking revolution" beginning in 2007).
7 See Natural Gas Imports and Exports, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://perma.cc/M9NS-BXPW (last updated July 21, 2020) (indicating the U.S. has been a
net exporter of natural gas since 2017); Where Our Natural Gas Comes From, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN. (Dec. 14, 2020), https://perma.cc/QX8U-KAJ3 (describing locations of U.S. natural gas production); James W. Coleman, Pipelines & Power-Lines: Building the Energy
TransportFuture, 80 OHIo STATE L.J. 263, 273-74 (2019) (discussing growth in U.S. natural
gas production).
8 FrequentlyAsked Questions: What Countriesare the Top Producersand Consumers of
Oil?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://perma.cc/5N9P-7VLX (last updated Dec. 1, 2020).
9 What is U.S. Electricity Generation by Energy Source, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://perma.cc/RKQ2-PFWH (last updated Nov. 2, 2020); Renewable Energy, CTR. FOR
CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONs, https://perma.cc/H5EF-LA2V (last visited Oct. 25, 2020);
Electricity Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://perma.cc/R5AN-5JKK (last updated Mar. 20, 2020); AMERICAN CLEAN POWER, ACP MARKET REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER'
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the stage, creating the promise of a transportation sector less dominated
by fossil fuels. These changes in both the electricity sector and the
transportation sector created the real potential for a significant clean
energy transition with natural gas replacing coal in the electricity sector,

followed by renewables replacing natural gas in that same sector, and a
newly decarbonized electric grid powering the transportation sector.
But this type of clean energy "dominance" was not what President
Trump had in mind. Instead, his focus was squarely on energy dominance
through the fossil fuel industry. 10 He promised to revive the coal industry;
reduce environmental regulation (which he termed "job killing
regulations") on the coal, oil, and natural gas industries; roll back climaterelated regulations and international commitments like the Paris climate
11
accords; oppose wind energy at every turn; and halt energy efficiency
developments such as increased use of LED lightbulbs. He also made a
brief attempt to purchase Greenland from Denmark, attracted to
Greenland's reserves of oil and other natural resources, providing the
U.S. public with a helpful review of both world geography and European
political history.12
In this realm, the Trump administration was laser-focused with few
distractions and no obvious internal dissention. The federal agencies
promptly got to work to repeal the Clean Power Plan designed to reduce
GHG emissions from the electricity sector and replace it with the
"Affordable Clean Energy Rule" designed to eliminate any requirement
for GHG emissions reduction. The U.S. Department of Energy made
several efforts to create rules to subsidize coal plants in the name of
national security. The EPA and the U.S. Department of Transportation
enacted new rules to roll back President Obama's signature regulations
to reduce GHG emissions from the auto sector as well as reverse the
preemption waiver the Obama administration EPA had granted to the
State of California to set its own, stricter vehicle emission regulations.
The Interior Department accelerated the leasing of oil and gas resources
on public lands and in offshore waters, and reduced or eliminated
protections for public lands set aside for large wind and solar
developments and for protection of species like the sage grouse. President
Trump himself issued a series of executive orders to greenlight the
controversial Keystone XL and Dakota Access oil pipelines, shrink
national monuments like Bears Ears and Grand Staircase Escalante to
2020, at 7 (2021), https://perma.cc/Y6FC-2Y7V (showing growth in U.S. wind power since
2000).
10 Davies et al., supra note 5.
11 See, e.g., Benjamin Storrow, Northeast States Hit Snag on Offshore Wind: Trump,
E&E NEWS: ENERGY TRANSITIONS (June 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/J5QA-HGSY. See also
Scott Streater, BLM "Behindthe Curve" on Large-Scale Solar: Report, E&E NEWS: PUBLIC
LANDS (June 16, 2020), https://perma.cc/LR76-M6AY; Scott Streater, Report Rips Trump's
"Cold-Shoulder Treatment" of Wind, Solar, E&E NEWS: GREENWIRE (June 25, 2020),
https://perma.cc/K397-W3CH.
12 Laura Gegel, Trump Says He Wants to Buy Greenland. Here's Why, LIVE SCI. (Aug.
16, 2019), https://perma.cc/XZW3-6MV7.
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facilitate more fossil fuel extraction in Utah, restart coal leasing on public
lands, and set the stage for agency actions to reduce regulations designed
to protect natural resources and the public from onshore and offshore
catastrophic oil spills. In sum, when it came to reducing environmental
regulations on the fossil fuel sector, the Trump administration certainly
spoke with one voice and was not distracted or sidetracked, as it had been
in other areas such as international trade, public health, or immigration.
A variety of news sources meticulously documented these regulatory
rollbacks and the amount of federal government resources directed at this
effort was quite remarkable. 13
Now, four years after the 2016 election, the obvious question is: Did
the Trump administration achieve its goals? To answer that question in
the context of the U.S. energy transition requires formulating additional,
more targeted questions. These include: (1) Did the rollback of
environmental regulations on the energy industry overcome economic
trends in the energy sector?; (2) To what extent were individual states,
local governments, tribes, and industry able to resist the Trump
administration's policies?; and (3) What role did the courts play in
resolving lawsuits brought by states, tribes, environmental advocacy
groups, and others to challenge the administration's energy policies?
As shown below, federal energy policy is only one of many influences
on the U.S. energy landscape. While it is clearly important, and, in some
areas, dominant, there are large swaths of the U.S. energy space where
state policy, technology developments, and energy economics are as
important or more important in shaping the U.S. energy sector. The
remainder of this Essay tracks these developments with regard to the
electricity sector, the transportation sector, energy development on
federal public lands, and targeted energy infrastructure projects. It
explores where federal policy had a significant influence on the energy
transition; where it did not; and the important role of the courts,
particularly in the context of public lands policies and federal approval of
select fossil fuel infrastructure projects.
III.

THE

ELECTRICITY SECTOR: THE LIMITS OF FEDERAL POLICY

Any discussion of U.S. energy transition in the electricity sector must
start with the role of coal. In the United States, coal is an abundant,
domestic, historically low-cost fossil fuel that dominated the electricity
sector for all of the 20th century and the start of the 21st century. It also
produces more C02 emissions and other air pollutants than other fossil
fuels, such as natural gas or oil, for the equivalent amount of energy. By
the start of the Trump administration in 2016, however, coal was in the
13 See Nadja Popovich et al., The Trump Administrationis Reversing 100 Environmental
Rules. Here's the Full List, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2020), https://perma.cc/6L3A-SPP6; Tracking Deregulation in the Trump Era, BROOKINGS (May 22, 2020), https://perma.cc/QYS8QCWZ; Regulatory Rollback Tracker, HARV. ENV'T & ENERGY L. PROGRAM,
https://perma.cc/3LED-4QFS (lastvisited Feb. 23, 2021).
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midst of a major decline as a result of cheap natural gas from fracking,
competition from the growth of low-cost renewable energy, and stricter
environmental regulations.
In attempting to reverse this trend, President Trump did not take on
the natural gas industry, which competes with coal directly in the
electricity sector, but instead focused on the remaining obstacles to
continued coal use, particularly environmental regulations. In speeches
in 2017, he promised to "lift restrictions on American energy, including
4
shale oil, natural gas and beautiful, clean coal"1 and declared: "We are
putting our coal miners back to work. We have ended the war on
5
beautiful, clean coal. We have stopped the EPA intrusion."1 President
Trump and his administrative agencies certainly made every effort to
accomplish this goal. With regard to wholesale electricity markets, his
Department of Energy proposed a rule for the Federal Energy Regulation
Commission (FERC) to adopt that would provide billions of dollars of
subsidies to coal-fired power plants in the name of national security.16
When FERC declined to enact the rule, as was its prerogative under the
applicable federal statute, President Trump intensified his assault on
Obama-era environmental regulations. He lifted a moratorium on federal
coal leasing President Obama had imposed in 2016; the EPA rescinded a
host of regulations governing the use of coal-fired power, most notably
repealing the Clean Power Plan; and he strongly supported Congress's
use of the Congressional Review Act in 2017 to overturn the stream
protection rule-an Obama-era regulation to limit the use of mountaintop
coal mining by regulating the disposal of overburden into the nation's
rivers and streams. 17

14 Ryan Teague Beckwith, Read a Transcriptof President Trump's CPAC Speech, TIME
(Feb. 24, 2017), https://perma.cc/5EQX-XP9V,
15 Trump at West Virginia Rally: "We are Putting Our Coal Miners Back to Work",
WMUR (Aug. 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/AWQ9-TLAT.
16 See Sharon B. Jacobs, The Statutory Separationof Powers, 129 YALE L.J. 378, 416-18
(2019) (discussing DOE proposed "Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule"); Grid Resilience Pricing
Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 46940 (Oct. 10, 2017), https://perma.cc/JEQ4-MUHQ; Gavin Bade, FERC
Rejects DOE NOPR, Kicking Resilience Issue to Grid Operators, UTIL. DIVE (Jan. 8, 2018),
https://perma.cc/ME44-25P3.
17 Popovich et al., supra note 13; Tracking Deregulation in the Trump Era, supra note
13. Regulatory Rollback Tracker, supra note 13; Affordable Clean Energy Rule, U.S. ENV'T
PROTECTION AGENCY, https://perma.cc/37CC-U4GL (last updated July 15, 2020) (regulatory
documents on repeal of Clean Power Plan and enactment of "Affordable Clean Energy Rule"
to replace it).
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However, reducing environmental regulations on coal-fired power
plants cannot bring back coal if electric utilities do not want to buy it to
generate electricity. Unlike natural gas and oil, which are used in a

variety of residential, commercial, and industrial sectors, over 90% of
U.S. coal use is in the electric power sector. 18 Thus, if electric utilities
have business reasons to use fuels other than coal to generate electricity,
or states require them to do so, the domestic market for coal will continue

to decline. As shown by the diagram below, that is precisely what
happened.19
M4

1I

T22
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In recent years, National Public Radio, the Washington Post, and the
New York Times, among others news sources, have documented the
electricity sector's pivot away from coal starting in the late 2000s toward
greater use of natural gas and renewable energy, along with helpful
graphics showing the changing energy mix to produce electricity in all

fifty states. These graphics, along with recent data from the U.S. Energy
Information Administration, illustrate how coal has gone from making up
more than 50% of electricity consumption nationwide to only 23% in 2019
and was predicted to drop to 17% in 2020.20 Coal's decline has been even

18 U.S. Renewable Energy Consumption Surpasses Coal for the First Time in Over 130

Years, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May 28, 2020), https://perma.cc/4PSZ-F74B.
19 U.S. Coal-FiredElectricity Generation in 2019 Falls to 42-Year Low, U.S. ENERGY

INFO. ADMIN. (May 11, 2020), https://perma.ce/3QGZ-CNBU (showing decline in U.S. coalfired electricity generation).
20 Electricity Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://perma.cc/X5AS-28HN (last
updated Nov. 14, 2019); Short-Term Energy Outlook, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 9,
2020), https://perma.cc/2V7K-K5JZ; Nadja Popovich & Brad Plumer, How Does Your State
Make Electricity?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2020), https://perma.cc/G3R9-S34S (showing
changes in electricity by state over time); John Muyskens et al., Mapping How the United
States Generates Electricity, WASH. POST. (Mar. 28, 2017), https://perma.cc/KK5K-CY3T
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more dramatic in many individual states, with the only states continuing
to rely heavily on coal being those with economies historically tied to coal
extraction, such as West Virginia, Kentucky, North Dakota, and
Missouri. Even states with a long history of coal extraction, such as
Illinois and Pennsylvania, have significantly reduced their use of coal to
generate electricity in recent years. 21 Many states no longer rely on coal
at all to generate electricity, others are scheduled to close their last coal
plants soon, and in 2020, renewable energy was poised to generate a
22
larger share of U.S. electricity than coal for the foreseeable future. As a
result of these trends, with coal production already at record low amounts
in 2019, it was expected to drop another 25% in 2020.23 Moreover, the

declines in coal use nationwide, which began during the Obama
administration, accelerated during the Trump administration. This
raises the question of why strong federal policies designed to protect the
coal industry have failed.
The answer is that state policies, energy economics, and
technological developments are, in this context, far more powerful forces
than federal energy policy. First, it is the states, not the federal
government, that regulate which power plants electric utilities can build.
Since the 1990s, a large number of states have increasingly enacted
renewable portfolio standards (RPSs) requiring electric utilities to obtain
a certain percentage of electricity they sell to retail customers from
renewable energy resources. These percentages were modest in the early
years, usually not exceeding 20% or 25% by a particular date, such as
2020 or 2025. More recently, however, a few states have increased those
percentages significantly to 50% or more and several states in 2019 and

2020 enacted "100% clean energy" laws that require utilities to obtain
100% of the electricity sold to customers from carbon-free energy
resources. 24 Also starting in the 1990s, Congress enacted federal tax
credits for renewable energy generation that helped support the
construction of wind and solar plants across the country.
Electric utilities initially responded to these policies by purchasing
wind energy and then solar energy directly from merchant renewable
energy plants or in wholesale regional energy markets. In more recent
(discussing how each state creates electricity); Alyson Hurt, Coal, Gas, Nuclear, Hydro?:
How Your State GeneratesPower, NPR (Sept. 10, 2015), https://perma.cc/2JSV-NRZJ (showing how each state generated energy between 2004-2014). See also John Muyskens & Juliet
Eilperin, Biden Calls for 100 Percent Clean Electricity by 2035. Here's How Far We Have to
Go, WASH. POST (July 30, 2020).
21 State Profile and Energy Estimates, Illinois, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://perma.cc/VG6M-2YG4 (last updated May 21, 2020); State Profile and Energy Estimates, Pennsylvania, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://perma.cc/S8CN-S4PZ (last updated Aug. 15, 2019); Popovich & Plumer, supra note 20.
22 U.S. Renewable Energy Consumption Surpasses Coal for the First Time in Over 130
Years, supra note 18; Brad Plumer, In A First, Renewable Energy Is Poised to Eclipse Coal
in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2020), https://perma.cc/KT4Z-KT4R.
23 Short-Term Energy Outlook, supra note 20.
24 See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, Eminent Domain Law as Climate Policy, 2020 WIS. L.
REv. 49 (2020) (discussing state laws).
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years, as costs of renewable energy generation have declined and
technology has continued to improve, vertically integrated utilities in
traditionally regulated states have clamored to build their own renewable
energy plants with the blessing of state regulators, and merchant
generation companies have invested heavily in large solar and wind
projects, injecting even greater amounts of renewable energy into the
regional energy markets. 25

In 2019, renewable energy resources provided over 17% of U.S.
electricity, with wind and solar energy providing. nearly 10% of that
amount and growing rapidly. 26 In states with significant wind resources,
like Iowa, Oklahoma, and Kansas, those percentages are 30% or higher. 27
Moreover, as the offshore wind energy industry develops, states with
large, urban populations on the East Coast will join the Midwest and
Plains states as regions with access to local, large-scale renewable energy
resources. 28 A 2020 report from the Goldman School of Public Policy at
the University of California Berkeley explains how' present-day, low-cost
solar, wind, and battery storage could allow the United States to
transition to a 90% carbon-free electric grid as early as 2035.29 These
developments in renewable energy are one part of the story of coal's
demise.
But state policy and renewable energy development, while
important, are not the most significant reasons for coal's decline. Instead,
it is the advent of hydraulic fracturing technologies, beginning in 2007,
that is the primary culprit. Fracking created an abundant, domestic, and
25 See, e.g., Nathaniel Groenwald, Wind, Solar, Looking Better Against Coal-Report,
E&E NEWS: CLIMATEWIRE (June 3, 2020), https://perma.cc/D34J-NZVP(discussing international report which "found that electricity from wind or solar energy technology is proving
cheaper than continuing to operate coal-fired power facilities"); Guy Burdick, As Utility Solar Costs Drop 82%, US Renewables, Storage Leaders Target Majority Generation Share by
2030, UTIL. DIvE (June 3, 2020), https://perma.cc/JA87-87VU; Gang He et al., Rapid Cost
Decrease of Renewables and Storage Accelerate the Decarbonizationof China'sPower System, NAT. COMM. (May 19, 2020), https://perma.cc/M82W-WUDY (predicting decarbonization of electric grid in China due to renewable energy cost declines).
26 What is U.S. Electricity Generation by Energy Source?, supra note 9; Electricity Explained, supra note 9.
27 See State FactSheets, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N, https://perma.cc/C4L8-4H2H (last updated Apr. 2020); Wind Facts at a Glance, AM. WIND ENERGY AsS'N, https://perma.cc/73P49D4P (last visited Feb. 23, 2021).
28 Katherine Dunn, After "Decade of False Starts" Offshore Wind Power's Time Has Finally Come, lEA Says, FORTUNE (Oct. 28, 2019), https://perma.cc/5AB8-9UUE; ESTIMATING
THE VALUE OF OFFSHORE WIND ALONG THE UNITED STATES' EAST COAST, LAWRENCE
BERKELEY NAT'L LAB. (2018), https://perma.cc/3D7A-M2SH; Eric Niiler, Offshore Wind
Farms are Spinning Up in the US-At Last, WIRED (Apr. 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/9VW2H4LA; Bob Woods, US Has Only One Offshore Wind Energy Farm, But a $70 Billion Market
is On the Way, CNBC (Dec. 13, 2019), https://perma.cc/C7SJ-QE4E; U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
2018 OFFSHORE WIND TECHNOLOGIES. MARKET REPORT (Aug. 2019), https://perma.cc/HD348B2M; Heather Richards, N.J. Plans Massive Offshore Wind Port, E&E NEWS: RENEWABLE
ENERGY (June 16, 2020), https://perma.cc/3KDJ-AQTL. But see Storrow, Northeast States
Hit Snag on Offshore Wind: Trump, supra note 11.
29 GOLDMAN SCH. OF PUB. POL'Y, U.C. BERKELEY, 2035: THE REPORT (2020),
https://perma.cc/N59F-PM4V.
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now low-cost energy resource that electric utilities were already familiar
with-natural gas-that could serve as a "baseload" fuel in place of coal.
Although the substitution of gas for coal is controversial, as natural gas
is also a fossil fuel with GHG emissions, it is this substitution that first
fueled and then accelerated the transition away from coal.
Another factor supporting the movement away from coal is the
increased reliance on larger, regional grids, known as Regional
Transmission Organizations (RTOs) that manage wholesale energy and
capacity markets in large swaths of the country. These RTOs have
reduced wholesale electricity prices significantly, putting further
pressure on electric utilities to retire coal plants that can no longer
compete in those markets against low-cost gas and renewable energy
resources.3 0 Technological developments in battery storage have also
begun to reduce reliability and variability concerns associated with
renewable energy, allowing those resources to participate more fully in
RTO markets and rendering the term "baseload power" nearly obsolete.
Thus, while it was certainly politically helpful for President Trump
and his allies to blame the demise of coal on heavy-handed federal
environmental regulations, the U.S. Department of Energy's own report
in 2017 acknowledged what experts had been saying for a long time-that
the Obama administration's environmental regulations on coal-fired
power plants were not the primary reason for the transition away from
coal. Instead, cheap natural gas, which competes directly with coal in the
electricity sector, was the primary culprit. 31 As a result, it is unlikely
President Trump was able to even slow the demise of coal, much less stop
it, in the last four years.
Questions certainly remain with regard to how quickly the nation
can pivot away from natural gas toward an electricity system that runs
on all or virtually all carbon-free resources. And through his rollback of
Obama-era environmental regulations, President Trump may well have
slowed that transition by paving the way for greater investments in
natural gas and allowing coal plants to remain online longer than they
might have in another administration. Nevertheless, the Trump
administration appears to have failed in its efforts to protect and preserve

30 See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, STAFF REPORT TO THE SECRETARY ON ELECTRICITY

MARKETS AND RELIABILITY 13-14 (Aug. 2017), https://perma.cc/N676-54HV (discussing coal
plant retirements).
31 See id. at 13-14 (concluding that "[t]he biggest contributor to coal and nuclear plant
retirements has been the advantaged economics of natural gas-fired generation" followed by
energy efficiency measures reducing electricity demand, the rise of renewable energy, and
then, finally, some financial impact from environmental regulations). See also Michael Drysdale, Farewell to Coal?, 62 ROCKY MOUNTAIN MIN. L. INST. 17 (2016); Charles D. Kolstad,
What is Killing the Coal Industry?, STAN. INST. FOR ECON. POL'Y RES. (Mar. 2017),
https://perma.cc/J5R9-VDLT; James Van Nostrand, Why the U.S. Coal Industry and its Jobs
Are Not Coming Back, YALE ENV'T 360 (Dec. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/K24H-LYXA.
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coal, demonstrating the limits of federal policy when it comes to certain
aspects of the electricity arena. 32
IV.

THE TRANSPORTATION SECTOR: THE IMPORTANCE OF FEDERAL POLICY

Unlike the electricity sector, which is powered by a mix of natural
gas, renewable energy, nuclear, and coal, the transportation sector relies
almost exclusively on oil-gasoline, diesel fuel, and jet fuel-which make
up over 90% of transportation energy sources. 33 Moreover, because of the
transition in the electricity sector away from coal and towards natural
gas and renewable energy, GHG emissions from the electricity sector
have declined substantially since the late 2000s, and the transportation
sector is now the nation's largest source of GHG emissions. 34 Thus, as
other nations have also recognized, 35 it is imperative that the United
States enact policies to reduce GHG emissions from cars, trucks, and
other transportation sector sources through tax credits, mandates,
technology funding, and the like. This is an area where federal and state
policy, technological developments, government funding, industry action
(both voluntary and in response to government policy), and consumer
behavior all play a role. However, as shown below, federal policy plays a
larger role in the transportation sector than it does in the electricity
sector, which means the Trump administration's policies in this area
likely had a greater immediate and long-term impact on slowing U.S.
energy transition.

GHG reductions in the transportation sector are a function of
reducing individual car trips through greater use of public transit, bikes,
and walking coupled with reducing the emissions from vehicles
themselves through stricter fuel economy and emissions standards, which
includes replacing gasoline-powered vehicles with _ EVs.36 While
recognizing the importance of transportation planning and reducing car

trips for achieving a clean energy transition, this Part focuses solely on
policies designed to reduce GHG emissions from individual cars and
32 See Benjamin Storrow, More Coal Has Retired Under Trump Than in Obama's Second
Term, E&E NEWs: CLIMATEWIRE (June 22, 2020), https://perma.cc/4KDE-LPD3 ("The coal
industry's woes demonstrate the limits of Trump's ability to control sweeping changes in
America's power sector.").
33 Uses of Energy for Transportation,U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://perma.cc/JP8UGQDW (last updated June 2, 2020).
34 Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. ENV'T PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://perma.cc/TL8K-TSYJ (last visited Oct. 25, 2020). See also Carmakers Must Overhaul
Production Plans to Hit Climate Goals, REUTERS (June 10, 2020), https://perma.cc/DP2Y3YWR (describing a report showing deficiencies in automaker production plans with regard
to reducing GHG emissions from transportation sector).
35 See, e.g., E.U. Warns Automakers to Significantly Cut Emissions, E&E NEWS:
CLIMATEWIRE (June 4, 2020), https://perma.cc/3BV3-SNDP.
36 Carbon Pollution from Transportation, U.S. ENv'T PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://perma.cc/9VD3-LPKH (last updated Nov. 20, 2020); DAVIES ET AL., ENERGY LAW AND
POLICY 497-99 (2d ed. 2018); Vicki Arroyo et al., New Strategies for Reducing Transportation Emissions and Preparingfor Climate Impacts, 44 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 919 (2017).
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trucks. I focus on these tools because the federal government plays a
much larger role in setting policies for vehicle emissions than it does in
promoting mass transit or non-vehicle use. Americans will not easily give
up their cars and trucks, and vehicle emissions policy is an area where
the Trump administration was extremely active.
The Clean Air Act requires the EPA to regulate air emissions from
vehicles while other federal statutes require the National Highway
Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) within the U.S.
Department of Transportation to regulate vehicle fuel economy. Because
vehicle fuel economy is closely related to vehicle emissions, since the start
of the Obama administration, the two agencies have issued joint
rulemakings to address both vehicle emissions and vehicle fuel economy
together. The federal government first regulated GHG emissions from
automobiles in 2009, when the EPA under President Obama issued an
"endangerment finding" with regard to those emissions following the
Supreme Court's 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA.37 In a series of
rulemakings during the Obama administration, the two federal agencies
set significantly stricter vehicle emission and fuel economy standards for
cars and light trucks and, later, heavy trucks. These regulations imposed
increasingly stricter standards (approximately 5% per year) for each
automaker's fleet between 2012 and 2025 that would result in an overall
industry average fuel economy of 54.5 miles per gallon by 2026 if the GHG
38
standards were met solely through improved fuel economy. For each
auto company that does not meet the yearly standard across its entire
39
fleet, there are federal statutory penalties.
In these rulemakings, the federal agencies worked closely with
California, which is the only state with statutory authority under the
Clean Air Act to set its own vehicle emission standards if it receives a
"preemption waiver" from EPA.40 Other states may adopt the California
standard so there is always the potential for two standards nationwide.
The Obama administration EPA granted California's request for a waiver
(it had been denied earlier by the George W. Bush administration EPA)
and then worked consistently with California officials to develop a single
standard for automakers to meet. EPA also granted California a
preemption waiver to allow it to enact a Low Emissions Vehicle (LEV)

37 Massachusetts v. U.S. Env't Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
38 2017 and Later Model Years Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 66,623, 62,626, 62,627 n.3 (Oct. 15,
2012); U.S. ENV'T PROTECTION AGENCY, REGULATORY ANNOUNCEMENT: U.S. EPA, EPA AND
NHTSA SET STANDARDS To REDUCE GREENHOUSE GASES AND IMPROVE FUEL ECONOMY FOR
MODEL YEAR 2017-2025 CARS AND LIGHT TRUCKS (2012), https://perma.cc/2N5A-TMRA;
Fact Sheet: SAFE Vehicles Rule, NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,
https://perma.cc/X9C3-WA4E (last visited Oct. 25, 2020) (discussing changes in SAFE Vehicle Rule from 2012 rule).
39 See ALEXANDRA B. KLASS & HANNAH J. WISEMAN, ENERGY LAW 127 (2d ed. 2020) (dis-

cussing penalty provisions).
40 Id. at 124-25 (discussing California waiver provisions in the Clean Air Act).
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program and Zero Emission Vehicle (ZEV) program. 4' The ZEV program
requires automakers to sell a certain percentage of EVs in the state to
spur consumer purchases of EVs. As of 2020, fourteen states had adopted
the LEV program, eleven states had adopted the ZEV program and more
states were in the process of adopting both programs. 42

President Trump made clear early in his term he would make it a
priority to roll back the prior administration's vehicle emission and fuel
economy standards and revoke California's preemption waivers. He did
so even though the auto industry was opposed to a full rollback of the
standards, preferring regulatory certainty and uniform standards to
uncertainty driven by litigation over the rollbacks and the potential for
different standards in different states. One might wonder why the Trump
administration would pursue this deregulatory course even though the
target of the regulation-the auto industry-opposed it. To answer this
question requires considering the industry most harmed by stricter
standards. It is not the auto industry, which must transition to cleaner
vehicles to meet global standards anyway, but the oil industry, which
stands to lose significant market share if cars and trucks are more fuel
efficient or run on electricity rather than gasoline or diesel fuel.4 3 Thus in
2019, EPA and NHTSA revoked California's preemption waiver, and in
2020, the agencies reduced the required yearly GHG reduction and fuel
economy increases from 5% per year through 2026 to 1.5%.44

Numerous states and environmental groups immediately challenged
these actions in federal court and several auto companies-Honda, Ford,
Volkswagen, and BMW-announced their intent to continue to follow the
stricter California standards voluntarily, despite a threat by the Trump
administration, later withdrawn, to initiate an antitrust inquiry against

41 U.S. State Clean Vehicle Policies and Incentives, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY
SOLUTIONS, https://perma.cc/554V-3BW9 (last updated Jan. 2019); Advanced Clean Cars
Program, CAL. AIR RESOURcEs BOARD, https://perma.cc/U6FR-LLJB (last visited Oct. 25,
2020) (discussing LEV and ZEV programs).
42 KLASS & WISEMAN, supra note 39, at 124-25; Rulemaking: Clean Cars
Minnesota,
MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, https://perma.cc/725X-EGGW (last visited Feb. 23,
2020) (discussing proposal to adopt LEV and ZEV programs); Maxine Joselow, Nev. Steers
Toward Tougher Tailpipe Standards, E&E NEWS (June 22, 2020), https://perma.cc/28F5JD55 (reporting that 13 states and the District of Columbia had adopted the LEV standards,
representing 40% of all cars sold in the United States, that ten states had already adopted
the ZEV standards, and that Nevada was beginning the rulemaking process to adoption
California's clean car rules).
43 Hiroko Tabuchi, The Oil Industry's Covert Campaignto Rewrite American Car Emission Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2018), https://perma.c/7TTT-KCFP.
44 See The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One: One National
Program, 84 Fed. Reg. 51,310 (Sept. 27, 2019), https://perma.cc/F623-4B5L (rescinding California's preemption waiver); The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for
Model Years 2021-2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 85 Fed. Reg. 24,174 (Apr. 30,
2020), https://perma.cc/9FXU-CXYB (relaxing vehicle emission standards and fuel economy
standards for model years 2021-2026); Coral Davenport, U.S. to Announce Rollback of Auto
Pollution Rules, A Key Effort to Fight Climate Changes, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2020),
https://perma.cc/4BMN-9T8N (discussing SAFE Vehicles rule).
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the companies.4 5 Nevertheless, unless the courts invalidate the new rules
or Congress overrides them, there is very little states can do to impose
stricter standards on the auto industry.
While vehicle emission standards and fuel economy standards focus
on regulating the auto industry to achieve cleaner transportation,
incentives for the purchase of EVs focus on consumers. To date, these
incentives exist at both the state level and the federal level. Under federal
law, consumers purchasing an EV are eligible for a federal tax credit of
up to $7,500 depending on the size of the car battery. However, the tax
credit declines and then phases out completely after an automaker sells
200,000 EVs. As a result, tax credits are no longer available for EV
purchases from Tesla or General Motors (which manufacturers the Chevy
Bolt).46 Further subsidization of electric vehicle purchases will be
necessary to spur a large-scale consumer switch to EVs and, not
surprisingly, President Trump opposed any additional subsidies for EVs.
47
Notably, however, many states have additional tax subsidies for EVs.
Members of Congress have introduced numerous bills to create
additional tax incentives for EV purchases and to fund EV charging
infrastructure on highway corridors and in other public areas. With
regard to EV-related bills, these include the Zero-Emissions Vehicles Act
of 2019 (H.R. 2764/S. 1487),4s which would amend the Clean Air Act to
create a national zero-emissions vehicle standard for automakers
whereby zero-emissions vehicles, including but not limited to EVs, must
make up 50% of new car sales by 2030 and 100% by 2040. The Driving
America Forward Act would provide a tax credit of up to $7,000 for the
purchase of an EV, with a vehicle cap of 600,000 total vehicles per
automaker, and the Electric Credit Access Ready at Sale (Electric CARS)
Act of 201949 would repeal the vehicle cap altogether and extend the
$7,500 tax credit through December 31, 2029. Federal and state
legislation focused on electrifying delivery trucks, equipment, and school
buses is also critical. California has already implemented a program for
electrifying buses and trucks, which other states have agreed to join, that
could serve as a model for Congress.60

45 See Roberto Baldwin, Justice Department Drops Antitrust Probe into Honda, BMW,
Ford, and VW, CAR & DRIvER (Feb. 7, 2020), https://perma.cc/8E86-3Y3X.
46 The State of Electric Vehicle Tax Credits, CLEAN CHARGE NETWORK (Mar. 2020),
https://perma.cc/P8E9-VMSL; Keith Lainge, GM, Tesla Headfor New Year Without Electric
Vehicle Tax Credits, TRANSPORT TOPICS (Dec. 27, 2019), https://perma.cc/KQ3G-WJG4.
47 State Incentives, PLUG IN AMERICA, https://perma.cc/T56P-C55A (last visited Feb. 27,

-

2021).
48 Zero-Emissions Vehicles Act of 2019, S. 1487, 116th Cong. (2019).
49 Electric CARS Act of 2019, S. 993, 116th Cong. (2019).
50 S.L. Fuller, CARB Passes Clean Trucks Rule, Setting Stage for No-Diesel Sales in California by 2045, TRANSPORT DIVE (June 26, 2020), https://perma.cc/D7NM-YKYY (reporting
on new California rule to require truck fleets in the state to transition to zero emission to
reduce transportation GHG emissions); S.L. Fuller, 15 States, D. C. Will Collaborateon 100%
22
Electric Truck Sales by 2050, TRANSPORT DIVE (July 14, 2020), https://perma.cc/CC
EGBA.
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With regard to EV charging infrastructure, Section 1413 of the
Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act),51 enacted in
2015, required the U.S. Department of Transportation to designate by
2020 national alternative fuel corridors (AFCs) to promote alternative
vehicle use, including EVs. Since that time, the Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA) has been working with industry, other federal
agencies, and state and local governments, to plan AFCs, develop uniform
signage, determine when highway segments are "corridor ready," and
help fund charging infrastructure within AFCs. FHWA is also helping
coordinate funding from other related programs, such as Volkswagen's
multibillion-dollar Electrify America investments resulting from the
company's vehicle emission cheating settlement with EPA and the state
of California. Additional legislation is required to provide more funding
for this program and accelerate its implementation.
As for proposed legislation, the Clean Corridors Act of 201952 would
create a grant program for state, tribal, and local governments to install
EV charging infrastructure along the National Highway System. The
CLEAN Future Act introduced in the U.S. House includes numerous
measures to support a shift to low- and zero-carbon transportation fuels
through supporting state and local government investment in EV
charging infrastructure, support for private sector investment in the

same, and aggressive goals to transition federal fleets to EVs.53 The Act
also directs the Department of Energy to focus on the transportation
needs of underserved and disadvantaged communities. 54 In 2020, the U.S.
House released the INVEST in America Act, 55 a nearly $500 billion, fiveyear, transportation infrastructure bill that includes a $350 million per
year grant program to build EV charging and hydrogen fueling
infrastructure in designated AFCs.6 6 States have also enacted legislation
to support EV charging infrastructure and state public utility
commissions have worked with their states' electric utilities to be part of
that build-out.57

51 Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act, P.L. 114-94, 129 Stat. 1312 (2015) (codified as amended in scattered sections of Titles 12, 16, 22, 23, 26, 40, 42, and 49 of the U.S.
Code).
52 Clean Corridors Act of 2019, S. 674, 116th Cong. (2019).
53 Climate Leadership and Environmental Action for Our Nation's (CLEAN) Future Act,
H.R. __, 116th Cong. (2020) (discussion draft), https://perma.cc/77QW-XQFT.
54 Id. § 434.
55 INVEST in America Act, H.R. 7095, 116th Cong.. (2020).
56 See THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, THE INVEST
IN AMERICA ACT: SECTION BY SECTION SUMMARY,
§ 1303 (June 3, 2020),
https://perma.cc/88A7-EH62; Press Release, Committee Leaders Unveil the INVEST in
America Act, a Transformational Surface Transportation Bill to Bring Nation's Infrastructure into a New Era (June 3, 2020), https://perma.cc/LT7D-NJBF.
57 See, e.g., Alexandra B. Kiass, Regulating the Energy "FreeRiders," 100 B.U. L. REV.
581 (2020) (discussing state policies supporting EV charging investment); Alexandra B.
Kiass, Public Utilities and TransportationElectrification, 104 IOWA L. REV. 545 (2019)
(same).
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While these proposed laws would help usher in a clean energy
transition in the transportation sector, at this point all of them other than
the FAST Act are only proposed laws and not federal policy. As a result,
the Trump administration rollback of the Obama era vehicle emission
and fuel economy standards is sobering, even though it will undoubtedly
be reversed by the Biden administration. In the electricity sector, a
relatively small group of electric utility actors engages in careful planning
for their future electricity generation fleets based on a mix of sector
economics, predicted technological development, and a near certainty
that carbon limits will be imposed on their fleets in the near future. This
is why utilities are retiring coal plants early at a dizzying pace despite
President Trump's efforts to keep the plants open. By contrast,
transportation sector emissions are based at least in part on the collective
decisions of billions of consumers purchasing vehicles from a large group
of automakers. These automakers are planning for future regulation but
also responding to more immediate regulatory conditions as well as
current consumer demands for larger cars and SUVs in the face of low
gasoline prices.5 8 The rapid decarbonization of the electricity sector
cannot easily be replicated in the transportation sector, where less fuelefficient vehicles purchased today will remain on the roads for decades.
This is an area where federal clean transportation policy as well as
the courts are critical. Numerous states and environmental groups
challenged the Trump administration's rollback of the Obama-era vehicle
emission and fuel economy standards as arbitrary and capricious. How
the courts respond remains to be seen and President Biden has already
stated that he will quickly restart the Obama administration's approach
to vehicle standards and perhaps accelerate it. For its part, Congress
could codify the Obama-era standards or enact even stricter standards,
but such a move is unlikely in the absence of strong Democratic majorities
in both the U.S. House and Senate.
This section shows federal policy for energy transition in the
transportation sector is far more critical than it is in the electricity sector.
The states have less authority in this arena and automakers are often
responsive to the economics of oil prices, which are out of their control, as
well as consumer demand, which today favors larger vehicles in the face
of low oil prices. Thus, the Trump administration's policies acted to delay
a much-needed energy transition and it will take aggressive action by the
Biden administration and, perhaps, Congress, to reverse it.

58 Lawrence Ulrich, S.U.V. vs. Sedan and Detroit vs. The World, In A Fight for the Future, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2019), https://perma.cc/QC5Q-6P2G; David Muller, Light Trucks
Are Now A Record 69% of the U.S. Market, AUTOWEEK (Jan. 7, 2019),
https://perma.cc2XRQ-CFGD. See also Fuller, CARB Passes Clean Trucks Rule, Setting
Stage for No-Diesel Sales in Californiaby 2045, supra note 50 (reporting on new California
rule to require truck fleets in the state to transition to zero emission to reduce transportation GHG emissions).
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FEDERAL PUBLIC LANDS AND FEDERAL PROJECT APPROVALS: THE ROLE
OF THE COURTS

The prior Parts of this Essay explored the dramatic changes in
federal policy governing U.S. energy use. This section turns to the Trump
administration's policies governing energy development on federal public
lands and federal decisions to approve key energy infrastructure projects
such as pipelines. In the United States, a mix of federal and state law
govern energy production. State law governs fossil fuel and renewable
energy development on private and state lands with an overlay of federal
environmental laws such as the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and
other pollution prevention statutes. By contrast, federal law governs the
development of these resources on federal public lands, which means a
change in policy governing those lands can dramatically influence
whether those lands are used primarily for fossil fuel development,
renewable energy development, or the many other designated uses of
those lands such as timber, recreation, wildlife protection, mining, and
the like.
The Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the
authority to acquire, dispose of, and manage federal property through
duly authorized statutes and regulations. 59 There are about 640 million
surface acres of U.S. federal public lands, approximately 95% percent of
which is under the jurisdiction of four federal agencies-the Bureau of
Land Management (BLM), the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the
National Park Service (NPS) within the U.S. Department of the Interior
and the Forest Service within the U.S. Department of Agriculture. 60 The
BLM alone is responsible for 245 million acres (one-tenth of America's
land base) as well as 700 million acres of subsurface coal, oil, gas, and
other minerals underlying onshore federal lands. 61 For its part, the
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management
(BOEM) administers
approximately 1.7 billion acres of federal waters in the U.S. Outer
Continental Shelf (OCS), including issuing leases and permits for offshore
oil, gas, and renewable energy development.6 2 In 2017, approximately

24% of crude oil, 13% of natural gas, and 40% of coal production in the
United States came from federal public lands and waters.63
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act6 4 (FLPMA) governs
the BLM's administration of onshore public lands within its jurisdiction

59 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make
all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the
United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any
claims of the United States, or of any particular state.").
60 KATIE HOOVER ET AL., CONG. RESEARcH SERV., R43429, FEDERAL LANDS AND
RELATED RESOURcES: OVERVIEW AND SELECTED ISSUES FOR THE 116TH CONGRESS (2019).
61 Id.; What We Manage, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., https://perma.cc/J822-LWAL (last

visited Oct. 25, 2020).
62 HOOVER ET AL., supra note 60.
63 Id. at 12.

64 Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C.

§§

1701-1782 (2012).
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and directs it to manage those lands based on principles of "multiple use"
and "sustained yield." 65 This mandate gives the BLM significant
discretion to determine how to balance surface land uses among
"renewable energy development (solar, wind, other); conventional energy
development (oil and gas, coal); livestock grazing; hardrock mining (gold,
silver, other), timber harvesting; and outdoor recreation (such as
66
camping, hunting, rafting, and off-highway vehicle driving)." Other
67
federal statutes such as the Mineral Leasing Act, the Federal Coal
Leasing Amendments Act of 1976,68 and the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty
Management Act 69 impose additional statutory mandates on BLM with
regard to the leasing of federal subsurface coal, oil, and gas resources
underlying BLM and Forest Service lands. These laws, as implemented
by BLM regulations, set competitive leasing procedures, development
requirements, receipt of fair market value for use of public resources
through the payment of royalties to the federal government, and
70
environmental and land use protections.
With regard to offshore resources, BOEM leases offshore oil and gas
resources to private developers pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act 71 (OCSLA). As of 2019, there were 2,600 active oil and gas
leases on nearly 14 million acres on the OCS, in the Gulf of Mexico and
in the Alaska region. 72 According to BOEM, for 2019, offshore federal
production reached a record-high 683 million barrels of oil and just over
1 trillion cubic feet of gas, almost all of which was produced in the Gulf of
Mexico, making up about 16% of all U.S. oil production and 3% of U.S.
natural gas production. 73 BOEM is also responsible for leasing areas of
the OCS for offshore wind production. Several East Coast states have
enacted mandates and subsidies to promote offshore wind development,
and BOEM has issued several wind leases in the OCS, but none of the
projects have been built except a small one off the coast of Block Island,
Maine. 74 In 2016, the Obama administration had issued a leasing plan for
2017 to 2022 that included oil and gas leases only in the Gulf and Mexico
and Alaska and none in the Atlantic or Pacific regions, consistent with
recent past practices.
65 Id.
66 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 61.
67 Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181, 201-226-3 (2018).
68 Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976, 30 U.S.C. §§ 202a, 208-1 (2018).
69 Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1757 (2018).
70 See, e.g., Jayni Foley Hein, Federal Lands and Fossil Fuels: Maximizing Social Welfare in Federal Agency Leasing, 42 HARV. ENV'T L. REV. 1, 10-12 (2018) (discussing leasing
programs on federal lands).
71 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356b (2012).
72 HOOVER ET AL., supra note 60, at 16.
73 Oil and Gas Energy, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., https://perma.cc/G88R-28WS
(last visited Oct. 25, 2020).
74 HooVER ET AL., supra note 60, at 17. "As of January 2019, BOEM had issued 13 offshore wind energy leases in areas off the coasts of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, New York, New Jersey, and North Carolina. In December 2016, the
first U.S. offshore wind farm, off the coast of Rhode Island, began regular operations." Id.
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The President has independent authority by statute to protect and
preserve federal public lands and waters, including from the adverse
impacts of energy development. Under the Antiquities Act of 1906,75 the
President can "declare by public proclamation historic landmarks,
historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or
scientific interest that are situated on land owned or controlled by the
Federal Government to be national monuments." 76 Since its enactment,
numerous Presidents have used the Antiquities Act to create national
monuments, placing them off limits from mineral development and other
extractive industries. Recent proclamations creating large-scale
monuments include President Clinton's creation of the 1.8 million-acre
Grand Staircase Escalante National Monument and President Obama's
creation of the 1.35 million-acre Bears Ears National Monument, both in
Utah. The OCSLA delegates similar authority and allows the President
to "withdraw" acreage in the OCS from leasing. 77 President Obama
invoked this provision in 2015 and 2016 to permanently withdraw large

areas of the OCS in the Atlantic Ocean and in Alaskan waters from oil
and gas leasing. 78
The shift in energy policy from the Obama administration to the
Trump administration was particularly dramatic in the administration of

federal public lands and waters, where state policy has far less influence
and regulated parties (primarily the fossil fuel, industry) are much more
united in what they want-more fossil fuel extraction, faster permitting,
and decreased environmental regulation. As noted above, during the last
years of the Obama administration, President Obama created Bears Ears
National Monument, permanently withdrew large expanses of the OCS
from oil and gas drilling, and limited new offshore leases to existing oil
and gas regions in the Gulf of Mexico and off the coast of Alaska. He also
imposed a moratorium on new coal leases on federal lands to evaluate the
climate impacts of such leases as well as existing royalty rates. The BLM
enacted the "Methane Rule" which limited the release of methane-a
powerful GHG-from oil and gas operations on federal lands; the
"Fracking Rule," which created new standards for oil and gas wells using
fracking technologies on federal lands; and engaged in large-scale
planning to promote wind and solar energy on public lands and to protect

endangered species such as sage grouse.
President Obama also took steps to block controversial new fossil fuel
projects that required federal permits. He denied a Presidential Permit

76

Id.

§§ 320301-320303

(2012).

,

75 Antiquities Act of 1906, 54 U.S.C.

77 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356b (2012). "The President
of the United States may, from time to time, withdraw from disposition any of the unleased
lands of the outer Continental Shelf." Id. § 1341.
78 Presidential Memorandum-Withdrawal of Certain Areas of the United States Outer
Continental Shelf Offshore Alaska from Leasing Disposition (Jan. 27, 2015),
https://perma.cc/BL3N-K96F; Presidential Memorandum-Withdrawal of Certain Areas
Off the Atlantic Coast of the Outer Continental Shelf from Mineral Leasing Disposition
(Dec. 20, 2016), https://perma.cc/G92Z-YC33.
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for the international border crossing for the Keystone XL oil pipeline from
Alberta, Canada to the Gulf of Mexico and halted permitting for the
Dakota Access oil pipeline in North Dakota to complete a fuller review of
environmental protection and tribal concerns associated with the
pipeline.
In January 2017, however, President Trump took immediate steps to
reverse those actions though executive orders, new BLM regulations, and
repeal of Obama-era BLM regulations. He issued an executive order
reducing the acreage of the Bears Ears and Grand Staircase Escalante
national

monuments

by 85%

and 50%

respectively

and reversed

President Obama's withdrawal of large areas of the OCS from offshore oil
and gas drilling. 79 He vacated the moratorium on new coal leasing and
canceled the pending environmental review of the federal coal leasing
program. He granted the Presidential Permit for the Keystone XL
pipeline and the remaining federal permits for the Dakota Access
pipeline. The BLM stayed enforcement of the Methane Rule and Fracking
80
rule and then took steps to repeal and replace them. BOEM replaced
the more limited five-year plan for offshore oil and gas leasing with one
that included new leases in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, the Gulf of
Mexico, and expanded areas of Alaskan waters, including 90% of the total
acreage in the OCS.81 In 2018, the BLM offered triple the amount of oil
and gas leases on federal lands than during President Obama's second
82
term, including in areas designated as protected for sage grouse. While
advancing fossil fuel projects at record-breaking speed, the
administration significantly slowed the planning and approval of wind
83
and solar projects on public lands. This is only a sampling of actions
taken by the Trump administration to promote fossil fuel development on
federal lands and in federal waters above all other uses and to eliminate
any barriers posed by environmental regulations meant to address
climate change or preserve protected species and other natural
resources.

84

79 Juliet Eilperin, A Diminished Monument, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2019),
https://perma.cc/UYC8-2A7Z/; Joe Fox et al., What Remains of Bears Ears, WASH. POST (Apr.
2, 2019), https://perma.cc/4HGN-N6HL; Coral Davenport, Trump Opens National Monument Land to Energy Exploration, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2020), https://perma.ec/5R44-ET53.
80 See Niina H. Farah, "EnergyDominance" Under Fire as Court Revives Methane Rule,
E&E NEWS: GREENWIRE (July 16, 2020), https://perma.cc/2B59-PUCP (discussing Trump
administration repeal and replacement of Methane Rule and court invalidation of same).
81 LAURA COMAY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 44692, FIVE-YEAR OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS
LEASING PROGRAM FOR 2019-2024: STATUS AND ISSUES IN BRIEF 1 (2019).

82 Eric Lipton & Hiroko Tabuchi, Driven by Trump Policy Changes, A FrackingBoom on
Public Lands, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2018), https://perma.cc/JR8X-MZ8K.
83 See, e.g., Storrow, Northeast States Hit Snag on Offshore Wind: Trump, supranote 11;
Streater, BLM "Behindthe Curve" on Large-Scale Solar: Report, supra note 11.
84 With regard to renewable energy, the Trump administration has mostly taken the
opposite approach and used environmental law to create additional delays for pending projects. For instance, in 2019, BOEM announced the need for additional, comprehensive environmental review for a major wind project off the coast of Massachusetts-Vineyard Windbased on potential adverse impacts to fisheries and concluded in 2020 that the project would
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But in the rush to reverse the actions of the Obama administration
and to promote fossil fuel interests, President Trump took actions that
were beyond his authority under federal law and his federal agencies
often acted too quickly to achieve their long-term goals. This has resulted
in a string of adverse court decisions finding the President lacked
authority for his actions, or that the BLM improperly eliminated notice,
comment, or environmental review required under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 85 the National Environmental Policy Act,86 the
Endangered Species Act, 87 and other longstanding federal laws.
For instance, in 2019, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Alaska vacated President Trump's order revoking President Obama's
withdrawals in the OCS, finding the OCSLA authorized a President to
withdraw areas of the OCS from leasing but not to "un-withdraw" them
by canceling a prior President's withdrawal. 88 As a result, the Trump

administration's five-year plan for offshore oil and gas leases remained
on hold until the federal appeals court resolved the issue because many
of the areas designated for leasing were in areas President Obama had
withdrawn from leasing. 89 Moreover, the court's decision had implications
for litigation over President Trump's orders to shrink the Bears Ears and
Grand Staircase Escalante national monuments because the operative
language of the OCSLA is very similar to that in the Antiquities Act.90
Likewise, in March 2020, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia required a full environmental impact statement for the
already-built Dakota Access pipeline, raising questions about whether
the judge would also order the pipeline shut down while the study was
prepared. 91 And after years of litigation over the various federal
approvals for the Keystone XL pipeline, a federal judge in Montana held
result major adverse environmental impacts, injecting significant uncertainty into the continued viability of the project. See Heather Richards, Interior: Offshore Wind to Have Major
'Adverse" Effects, E&E NEWS: ENERGYWIRE (June 10, 2020), https://perma.cc/UWQ9-CHLF;
First Major Offshore Wind Farm Reaches Permitting Milestone, REUTERS (June 9, 2020),
https://perma.cc/SVY7-FC6H.
85 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301,
5335, 5372, 7521 (2018).
86 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321--4370h (2018).
87 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2018).
88 League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 363 F. Supp. 3d 1013 (D. Alaska 2019).
89 COMAY, supranote 81, at 2. See also Ben Lefebvre, Interiorto Push Drillingin Florida
Waters After November Election, POLITIcO (June 10, 2020), https://perma.c/4WNB-R5WW.
90 See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert Glicksman, A Defeat on Offshore Drilling
Extends the Trump Administration's Losing Streak in Court, THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 9,
2019), https://perma.cc/9TU2-FDA9 (discussing similarities between the two federal statutes); Jason Daley, Judge Blocks Oil Drilling in Arctic Ocean, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Apr. 1,
2019), https://perma.cc/GH6V-9JGR.
91 Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 440 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C.
2020); Niina Farah, Judge Axes NEPA Review of Dakota Access. Will it Shut Down?, E&E
NEWS: ENERGYWIRE (Mar. 26, 2020), https://perma.cc/8YY6-YFJB. See also Standing Rock
Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 985 F.3d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (affirming the
district court's finding that the Army Corps failed to conduct adequate environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act).
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in May 2020 that the federal nationwide permit issued to authorize river
and stream crossings for that pipeline (and all other oil and gas pipelines
under construction nationwide) was invalid for the agency's failure to
consult with the FWS regarding impacts to endangered species as
required under the Endangered Species Act.92 The same month, the same
court struck down BLM's plan to open millions of acres of western public
lands for oil and gas leasing that had been previously reserved for sage
grouse habitat on grounds that it violated FLPMA, and vacated hundreds
93
of oil and gas leases it found were issued illegally. Federal courts in
Montana and Idaho have invalidated several hundred oil and gas leases
BLM had issued on public lands for the agency's failure to adequately
evaluate the climate and groundwater impacts of the leases under the
National Environmental Policy Act and for violations of FLPMA.94
News articles regularly documented the string of losses sustained by
the Trump administration in federal court over its actions related to
energy development on public lands. 95 The administration's poor track
record is notable because of the deference courts are required to give to
federal agency decisions carrying out the federal statutes Congress has
authorized them to implement. As a result, in each case, the court had to
92 N. Plains Res. Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. CV 19-44-GF-BMM, 2020
WL 3638125 (D. Mont. May 11, 2020); Matthew Brown, Court Rejects Bid to Revive Canceled
U.S. Pipeline Program, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 28, 2020), https://perma.cc/JSQ3DHJZ; Niina Farah, "A Big Deal":Keystone XL Ruling Could Threaten OtherPipelines, E&E
NEWS: ENERGYWIRE (Apr. 22, 2020), https://perma.cc/3A2F-VCHU.
93 Montana Wildlife Fed'n v. Bernhardt, No. CV-18-69-GF-BMM, 2020 WL 2615631 (D.
Mont., May 22, 2020) ("As for the lease sales, the errors here occurred at the beginning of
the oil and gas lease sale process, infecting everything that followed. The proper implementation of the 2015 Plans' priority requirement [for sage grouse] means that BLM may not
include parcels included in the lease sales. This change affects everything else that happened in the oil and gas lease sales, including but not limited to BLM's NEPA analysis of
each lease sale, the protests that BLM received and the responses it provided to those protests, and potentially the EOIs that interested parties may have submitted in the first place.
The Court recognizes that the Government and states will need to return millions of dollars
to the interested parties who won lease sales, but that economic harm does not rise to the
level of harm that the Ninth Circuit has previously considered significant enough to warrant
remand without vacatur.").
94 Wildearth Guardians v. Zinke, 368 F. Supp. 3d 41 (D. Mont. 2019); Wildearth Guardians v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 457 F. Supp. 3d 880 (D. Mont. 2020) ("The problems with
BLM's [environmental assessments] largely relate to the absence of analysis rather than to
a flawed analysis. In other words, the Court does not fault BLM for providing a faulty analysis of cumulative impacts or impacts to groundwater, it largely faults BLM for failing to
provide any analysis.") (emphasis in original); Western Watersheds Project v. Zinke, 441 F.
Supp. 3d 1042 (D. Mont. 2020).
95 Jennifer A. Dlouhy-& Malathi Nayak, Trump's Scorn for Climate Change Meets Courts
Saying It Matters, BLOOMBERG: GREEN (June 9, 2020), https://perma.cc/WD36-SZZW (documenting agency losses in federal court); Anna M. Phillips, Courts Slow Trump Agenda to
Open Public Lands to Oil and Gas Drilling, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2020),
https://perma.cc/NMM5-N2NP; Trump's Fossil Fuel Agenda Gets Pushback from Federal
Judges, U.S. NEWS (Sept. 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/25H4-ZU44; Greg Stohr, Trump's Corner-CuttingFailsHim as Supreme Court Losses Mount, BLOOMBERG NEWS (June 19, 2020),
https://perma.cc/H2RC-QRAR; Farah, "EnergyDominance" UnderFireas Court Revives Methane Rule, supranote 80.

2021]

ENERGY TRANSITIONS

265

find that the agency action was "arbitrary and capricious" or failed to
follow procedural requirements in the Administrative Procedure Act or
other applicable statutes.
Litigation and appeals over these actions will very likely continue
into the Biden administration. However, the story of the Trump
administration's energy policy with regard to federal public lands
highlighted in this Part shows how important federal policy is when it
comes to use of public lands. Even though the Trump administration had
significant setbacks in the courts, it was still able to increase
substantially the use of federal lands for oil and gas development at the
expense of protected species and other natural resources, issue permits
for significant fossil fuel infrastructure that will last for decades, and
minimize the use of public lands and waters for renewable energy
resource development. However, this Part also illustrates the critical role
of the courts as a limit on the use of that federal power and the need for
constant vigilance on the part of environmental advocacy groups, states,
local governments, and other interested parties. To date, court decisions
have tempered the Trump administration's best efforts to completely turn
over federal public lands to oil and gas companies, but the leg'al battles
will no doubt continue.
VI. CONCLUSION

As this Essay goes to print, the Trump administration has come to
an end and the Biden administration has begun. President Biden has
assembled an impressive and experienced team to address the climate
crisis and has nominated the first Native American Interior SecretaryDebra Haaland-a Congresswoman with a strong track record on climate
and environmental protection. 96 President Biden took office with narrow
majorities in both the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate,
which was critical to any hope that he could carry out an aggressive
energy transition agenda. 97
But although there is cause for hope, there is also significant
damage. As detailed in this Essay, the Trump administration has stalled
many Obama-era initiatives, completely reversed others, and defunded
and demoralized the federal agencies that must do the real work to
implement the new administration's energy transition and GHG
reduction policies. 98 While critics of energy transition in general, or more
ambitious legislation like the Green New Deal, decry the costs of change,
the status quo is not cheap. Inaction has significant costs, as we have seen
from the record number of hurricanes, wildfires, floods, droughts, and
96 See Coral Davenport, Biden Picks Deb Haaland to Lead InteriorDepartment, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 17, 2020), https://perma.cc/J8MK-D2T6.
9? See Lesley Clark & Peter Behr, Will Senate Wins Unlock Biden's 100% Clean Energy
Agenda?, E&E NEWS (Jan. 7, 2021), https://perma.cc/6FY6-5VTY.
98 See, e.g., Adam Aton, Biden Climate Team Says It Underestimated
Trump's Damage,
E&E NEWS: CLIMATEWIRE (Jan. 6, 2021), https://perma.cc/SVL8-Q7CB.
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other U.S. and global disasters dangerously enhanced by climate change
in 2020 alone. 99 The year 2021 will be both challenging and exciting as
we close the door on the Trump administration and learn more about
1
what to expect from "Energy Transitions in the Biden Administration." 00

99 See Christopher Flavelle, U.S. Disaster Costs Doubled in 2020, Reflecting Costs of Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2021), https://perma.cc/SUZ3-LHFJ; Brian K. Sullivan,
Second-Warmest Year on Record Cost the World $210 Billion, BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 7, 2021),
https://perma.c/AR8G-UGL8; Brian K. Sullivan, Record Number of $1 Billion Disasters Hit
the U.S. in 2020, BLOoMBERG L. (Jan. 8, 2021), https://perma.cc/SYV2-ZX2W.
100 Exec. Order No. 13,986, 86 Fed. Reg. 7015 (Jan. 20, 2021), https://perma.cc/WPC6PLU4.

